The Kurdish Question in the Published Foreign Relations of the United States Documents (1969–1972)

Abstract

This study aims to document the Kurdish question in Iraq by examining the published Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents covering the period from 1969 to 1972, during the presidency of the late Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. It seeks to trace the progress and development of the Kurdish question in accordance with the chronological sequence of historical events. In addition, the study examines the extent of the influence of the individuals discussed in the research including government officials and influential policymakers who played active roles in the evolution of the Kurdish question. In fact, the events revealed that a significant change had occurred in the American position, namely the United States' support for the Kurds in their cause, shifting from indirect support to direct support and open attention after it had previously been carried out secretly. This change resulted from the countervailing Soviet influence and intervention, as well as the impact of Zionist–Kurdish relations on the other hand. In addition, it was influenced by the sensitive regional situation, represented by Iraq's emergence as an influential power in the region whose growing influence could not be restrained except by destabilizing its internal situation, particularly the unstable conditions in northern Iraq. Therefore, this study proceeded by presenting the historical events and explaining the Kurdish question and the major obstacles to its resolution through an examination of the different viewpoints and their approaches to finding a lasting formula for a settlement that would end the suffering of the Kurds and other nationalities and minorities, and ensure a dignified life within a single homeland based on democratic principles. However, the differing perspectives and the absence of mutual trust in implementing a clear mechanism for peace and democracy were among the principal factors behind the failure to resolve the issue, despite the adoption of a constitutional formula agreed upon by the Iraqi government and the Kurds under Soviet sponsorship. The Kurds did not capitalize on the new reality, due to their short-sighted approach toward political solutions and their persistent lack of trust in the successive Iraqi governments. They remained bound to the mentality of opposition and tribal leadership, which resulted in adverse consequences, namely the emergence of new political currents among the Kurds that sought to establish themselves and exploit the new circumstances for their own interests. This, in turn, further complicated the situation by creating a competitive environment among the Kurdish political poles, while the Iraqi government supported the factions loyal to it in order to pursue the solutions it considered most suitable for its internal conditions. As for the regional situation, it foreshadowed an impending war between the Arabs and the Zionists, prompting regional powers, particularly Iran, in cooperation with America and the Zionists, to attempt to divert Iraq from its national issues by supporting the Kurdish opposition, as well as to achieve gains in terms of borders and regional influence in the Arabian Gulf